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All laws are the product of compromise. In some cases, compro-
mise leads to ambiguity and imprecision. On these occasions, courts
may be unable to ascertain and enforce the underlying compromise
with precision.1 In other cases, compromise produces relatively clear
and precise provisions that establish specific powers, procedures, or
restrictions.2 On these occasions, courts pursuing interpretive fidelity
should strive to uphold the specific compromises incorporated into
enacted legal texts, especially the Constitution. By design, the proce-
dures governing the adoption and amendment of the Constitution
give political minorities extraordinary power to block constitutional
change and exact compromise as the price of assent. 3 At the Constitu-
tional Convention, the smaller states convinced the larger states to
© 2008 Bradford R. Clark. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
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1 The open-ended provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment arguably provide
an example. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2 The detailed provisions of Article I1, Section 1 governing the election of the
President and specifying precise eligibility requirements illustrate the point. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1.
3 SeeJohn F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitu-
tional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1713-22 (2004) (examining the procedures for adopt-
ing and amending the Constitution and their implications for the interpretation of
precise constitutional texts); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Under-
standing, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 125 (1996) ("Article V
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incorporate several precise provisions designed to enable the former
to protect their interests in the new federal government. These provi-
sions guarantee all states-regardless of size or population-equal suf-
frage in the Senate, and give the Senate or the states power to veto all
forms of "the supreme Law of the Land." These precise provisions
reflect and implement "the Great Compromise" hammered out
between the large and small states at the Constitutional Convention.
Respect for the rights of minorities in this process requires courts to
uphold the underlying compromise by adhering closely to the Consti-
tution's finely wrought provisions governing federal lawmaking and
supremacy.
In the article prompting this Symposium, I argued that the
Supremacy Clause safeguards federalism by conditioning supremacy
on adherence to constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures. 4
These procedures were designed to preserve the governance preroga-
tives of the states both by making federal law relatively difficult to
adopt and by assigning this task solely to actors subject to the political
safeguards of federalism. 5 The Supremacy Clause recognizes only
three sources of law as "the supreme Law of the Land"-the "Constitu-
tion," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the United States.6 Elsewhere, the
Constitution prescribes precise procedures to govern the adoption of
each of these sources of law.7 All of these procedures specifically
require the participation and assent of the Senate.8 Originally, these
procedures functioned to safeguard federalism in two ways: (1) by giv-
ing the states a role in the new federal government, and (2) by ensur-
was designed to permit a very small number of states (currently thirteen) containing
but a fraction of the total national population to block constitutional change.").
4 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321 (2001).
5 The "political safeguards of federalism" refer to the role of the states "in the
composition and selection of the central government." Herbert Wechsler, The Politi-
cal Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954). Elizabeth Garrett also profit-
ably reminds us that "[n]o analysis of the 'finely wrought' procedures of lawmaking is
complete without an assessment of [the] additional requirements" imposed by "the
internal rules of each [house of Congress], adopted pursuant to Article I, Section 5 of
the Constitution." Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REx'. 1495, 1495-96 (2008).
6 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
7 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 7; id. art. II, § 2; id. art. V.
8 The only potential exception involves the possibility that, on the application of
two-thirds of the state legislatures, Congress will "call a convention for proposing
Amendments" rather than propose them itself. See id. art. V. This procedure has
never been used and, in any event, arguably gives the states an even greater opportu-
nity to influence the amendment process.
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ing that small states would have disproportionate influence in
adopting "the supreme Law of the Land."9 Although I recognized the
second method in my original article,' 0 I perhaps did not sufficiently
emphasize the entrenchment of the small states' influence. That
entrenchment not only sheds light on the exclusivity of the lawmaking
procedures prescribed by the original Constitution, but also continues
to have functional relevance today.
The procedural safeguards of federalism were an integral part of
the compromise reached between small and large states at the Consti-
tutional Convention over the shape of the new Constitution.1"
Although the Convention rejected the small states' overall plan, it ulti-
mately made several specific concessions in order to prevent the small
states from opposing the Constitution. These concessions included
giving the states equal suffrage (as opposed to proportional represen-
tation) in the Senate and employing the Supremacy Clause and Arti-
cle III (rather than a congressional negative) to secure the supremacy
of federal law. These concessions are significant because-in con-
junction with constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures-they
give the small states (acting through the Senate) disproportionate and
perpetual power to veto all forms of "the supreme Law of the Land."
This veto power not only enables the small states' representatives in
the Senate to block lawmaking by the federal government, but also to
exact compromise as the price of assent (just as the small states did at
the Convention). This Article describes the origins and mechanics of
the procedural safeguards of federalism and suggests that courts pur-
9 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
10 See Clark, supra note 4, at 1371 (explaining that Article V's exemption of the
states' equal suffrage in the Senate from ordinary amendment "guarantees small
states-acting through their Senators-disproportionate and perpetual power to
block proposed provisions of the 'Constitution,' 'Laws,' and 'Treaties' of the United
States").
11 I agree with Carlos Vizquez that, strictly speaking, federal lawmaking proce-
dures safeguard the status quo rather than federalism by constraining both the adop-
tion and the repeal of federal law. Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Separation of Powers as
a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1604-08 (2008); see Clark,
supra note 4, at 1340 & n.90; infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. The Foun-
ders recognized this dynamic, but thought that Congress could draft around it if nec-
essary. SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 12, 1787),
in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 585, 587 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS] ("As to the difficulty of repeals, it
was probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of limiting the
duration of laws so as to require renewal instead of repeal."). For my specific
responses to Professor Vdzquez's other points, and those raised by Professor Strauss,
see Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1681 (2008).
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suing interpretive fidelity should respect such safeguards as crucial
and enduring compromises built into the constitutional structure.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Federal lawmaking procedures are designed to prevent any indi-
vidual, group, or faction from becoming too powerful and capturing
the legislative process. To that end, the Constitution starts by estab-
lishing a multimember legislature. 12  As Jeremy Waldron has
explained, legal texts will almost always reflect compromise when they
are "the product of a multi-member assembly, comprising a large
number of persons of quite radically differing aims, interests, and
backgrounds."'13 Lawmaking power is further diffused-and the need
for compromise further enhanced-by splitting the legislature into
two distinct bodies. In order to take action, the members of each
house must compromise not only with each other, but with members
of the other chamber as well. Giving the President a veto adds
another participant, necessitating further compromise. When legisla-
tive compromise results in the adoption of a clear legal text, courts
should adhere to its provisions in order to respect the lawmaking pro-
cess. If courts were free to disregard clear statutes produced through
compromise, they could defeat the purpose (and benefits) of a multi-
member, multihouse legislature checked by the executive.
The same is true of constitutional lawmaking and interpretation,
especially in a federal system. According to Vicki Jackson, "federal
constitutional arrangements are typically put together as a specific
'compromise' among existing power holders and . . . these arrange-
ments are typically part of a set of interrelated arrangements (a 'pack-
age deal')."14 Our Constitution is best understood in just these terms.
As John Manning has explained: "The constitutional lawmaking
processes prescribed by Articles V and VII reflect a conscious design
to give political (or at least geographical) minorities extraordinary
power to block constitutional change. Such political minorities,
therefore, also have extraordinary power to insist upon compromise
as the price of assent."' 5 Although such compromise sometimes
results in the adoption of relatively open-ended phrases like "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures,"' 6 it sometimes produces relatively
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.
13 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 125 (1999).
14 Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and TransnationalJudicial
Discourse, 2 INT'L. J. CONST. L. 91, 110 (2004).
15 Manning, supra note 3, at 1665.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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clear and precise texts designed to work together to implement com-
promise among constitutional stakeholders.I7
Several interrelated provisions of the original Constitution illus-
trate the latter category. These provisions give the states equal suf-
frage in the Senate;' 8 spell out precise procedures involving the
Senate to govern adoption of the "Constitution,"' 9 "Laws,"20 and
"Treaties" 21 of the United States; and confer supremacy only on these
three sources of law.22 Courts seeking to interpret the Constitution
faithfully "should adhere strictly to clear and rule-like constitutional
texts" like these.23 Failure to do so would ignore crucial compromises
built into the Constitution and necessary to secure its adoption.
Ignoring these compromises, moreover, would undermine the consti-
tutional legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking.
A. The Great Compromise
The stakes were high when the Constitutional Convention met in
Philadelphia in 1787. The Articles of Confederation had failed to
establish a workable government. If a new Constitution could not be
adopted, the union of states was in danger of breaking apart from
within or being conquered from abroad.24 Each state was entitled to
one vote at the Convention, 25 and the delegates anticipated that the
proposed Constitution would take effect only if ratified by a
supermajority of states. 26 This meant that the smaller states-repre-
senting a minority of the population-could block proposals favored
by the larger states-representing a majority of the population. The
standard account of the Convention is that it essentially adopted the
Virginia Plan (favored by the larger states) and rejected the New
17 See Manning, supra note 3, at 1735 ("Given the heightened consensus require-
ments imposed by Article V, when an amendment speaks with exceptional specificity,
interpreters must be sensitive to the possibility that the drafters were willing to go or
realistically could go only so far and no farther with their policy.").
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
19 Id. arts. V, VII.
20 Id. art. I, § 7, ci. 2.
21 Id. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
22 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
23 Manning, supra note 3, at 1719.
24 See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 105-07 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
25 See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
57 (1913).
26 SeeJACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 91, 102-08 (1996).
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Jersey Plan (favored by the smaller states) .27 On several key issues
affecting the overall structure and operation of the Constitution, how-
ever, delegates from large states were forced to compromise and
incorporate specific proposals favored by small states. These issues
included the basis for representation in the Senate and the mecha-
nism for ensuring the supremacy of federal law.28 Making concessions
on these matters was the price that the large states had to pay in order
to secure the small states' support for the new Constitution.29
Edmund Randolph "opened the main business" of the Conven-
tion by introducing a series of resolutions commonly known as the
27 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1992). For a more
nuanced account of the Convention's consideration of the Virginia and New Jersey
Plans, with emphasis on the alternative measures debated for ensuring the supremacy
of federal law, see James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power" The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
696, 705-73 (1998).
28 See Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 996-97
(2000) (observing that "even the most basic structural decisions of the 1787 Conven-
tion were . . . compromises-as in the 'Great Compromise' establishing the 'princi-
ple' . . . that only one house of the national legislature is apportioned by population
while the other is apportioned by state").
29 A few words about methodology seem appropriate. One could try and unearth
a specific original intent regarding the exclusivity of federal lawmaking procedures
and the role of the Senate, but one would encounter all of the standard problems
associated with collective intent and incomplete records. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutoy Legislative History?, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1308-10 (1998) (arguing that to the extent these difficulties
apply to divining legislative intent from historical materials, they should apply a forti-
ori to discerning the Founders' intent); see also Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 214 (1980) (observing that "there may be
instances where a framer had a determinate intent but other adopters had no intent
or an indeterminate intent"). My argument here, by contrast, is based primarily on
text and structure. To be sure, what we know about specific proposals and choices
made at the Convention helps us to put the text and structure in context, but it is not
essential to recognizing the compromise between large and small states reflected in
the composition of the Senate, the Supremacy Clause, and federal lawmaking proce-
dures. With respect to the exclusivity of federal lawmaking procedures, evidence
from the Convention of the actual compromise between small and large states serves
only to confirm the strong inferences to the same effect derived from the text and
structure of several interlocking provisions of the Constitution. Cf John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1337, 1354-62 (1998) (arguing that constitutional interpreters may consult
background sources such as The Federalist as a source of persuasion rather than as
authoritative evidence of meaning).
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Virginia Plan. 30 This Plan preserved the states, but proposed the
establishment of a new, fully functioning federal government with its
own bicameral legislature, executive, and judiciary.3' Two sticking
points quickly emerged-the proper means of securing the
supremacy of federal law and the basis for representation in the Sen-
ate. On the first issue, the Convention initially approved Randolph's
proposal that "the National Legislature ought to be impowered. . . to
negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opin-
ion of the National Legislature the articles of the Union. '3 2 The Vir-
ginia Plan did not initially address the second question. Rather, it
merely specified the method of selecting senators by proposing that
"the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to
be elected by the people of the several States," and that "the members
of the second branch ... ought to be elected by those of the first."33
The Convention rejected this proposal and decided unanimously that
"the members of the second branch of the national Legislature ought
to be chosen by the individual Legislatures. '" 34
The basis for representation in the Senate proved much more
contentious than the method of selection. The Convention initially
rejected a proposal "that each State have one vote," and approved a
proposal that "the right of suffrage in the second branch... ought to
be according to the rule established for the first."3 5 These votes sur-
prised and alarmed delegates from smaller states. 36 William Paterson
went so far as to declare that
30 SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in
1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 17, 18-23.
31 See id. at 20-22.
32 Id. at 21. Conflict between large and small states later emerged when Mr.
Pinckney moved to expand the negative to empower the national legislature to nega-
tive "'all [state] Laws which they shd. judge to be improper.'" James Madison, Notes
on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
11, at 164, 164. The Convention rejected this proposal to expand the negative. See id.
at 168.
33 Madison, supra note 30, at 20.
34 Journal of the Constitutional Convention (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 11, at 148, 149.
35 Journal of the Constitutional Convention (June 11, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 11, at 192, 193. The vote on both motions was six states to five.
Id.
36 SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention Uune 9, 1787), in
1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 175, 176-77 (recounting David Brearley's
comments that "[w]hen the proposition for destroying the equality of votes came for-
ward, he was astonished, he was alarmed").
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N. Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Committee.
She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to
a despot, than to such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan
here but on his return home do everything in his power to defeat it
there. 37
James Wilson responded that "[i]f the small States will not confeder-
ate on this plan, Pena. & he presumed some other States, would not
confederate on any other."38 In the wake of this impasse, small state
delegates sought and obtained further time "to contemplate the plan
reported from the Committee of the Whole" and to formulate an
alternative.3 9
The next day, William Paterson introduced the New Jersey Plan
as a comprehensive alternative to the Virginia Plan. According to
Madison, "this plan had been concerted among the deputations or
members thereof, from Cont. N.Y. N.J. Del. and perhaps Mr. Martin
from Maryd." 40 Paterson's Plan would have retained the equality of
the United States in Congress, but would have "revised, corrected &
enlarged" the Articles of Confederation to make them more effec-
tive. 4 1 In addition, in place of the congressional negative, the New
Jersey Plan proposed to make federal acts and treaties "the supreme
law of the respective States." 42 Although the Convention voted to
reject the New Jersey Plan and re-report the Virginia Plan,43 this did
not end the debate over the composition of the Senate or the congres-
sional negative. Thus, shortly after the vote, Luther Martin declared
that the states "entered into the confederation on the footing of
equality; that they met now to.. . amend it on the same footing, and
that he could never accede to a plan that would introduce inequality
and lay 10 States at the mercy of Va. Massts. and Penna."44
When the Convention again took up the basis for representation
in the Senate, Martin began the debate with a speech that lasted
"more than three hours" and insisted that "an equal vote in each State
37 Id. at 179.
38 Id. at 180.
39 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 14, 1787), in 1
FARFAND's REcoRDs, supra note 11, at 240, 240.
40 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1
FAR'D's REcORDs, supra note 11, at 242, 242 n.*.
41 Id. at 242.
42 Id. at 245.
43 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in I
FARAND's REcoRDs, supra note 11, at 312, 322.
44 Id. at 324.
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was essential to the federal idea."45 He concluded his remarks the
next day with "considerable vehemence" and proclaimed that "he had
rather see partial Confederacies take place, than the plan on the
table."46 Large state delegates were just as adamant in favor of pro-
portional representation, insisting that they "never could listen to an
equality of votes" in the Senate.47 In a remarkable response, Gunning
Bedford warned that the "Large States dare not dissolve the confeder-
ation. If they do the small ones will find some foreign ally of more
honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them
justice. 48 The Convention was now deadlocked on the question. 49
Seeking to prevent the Convention from "break[ing] up without
doing something, ' '5 0 the delegates appointed a Grand Committee to
seek a compromise. 51 Several days later, the Committee revealed its
report. The report proposed giving each state "an equal Vote" in the
Senate, and granting the House the right to originate "all Bills for
raising or appropriating money."52 Madison did not regard the pro-
posal "as any concession on the side of the small States. ' 53 Elbridge
Gerry, a member of the Committee, explained that he shared
Madison's concerns on the merits, but "assented to the Report"
because the delegates were "in a peculiar situation" 54 owing to the
small states' refusal to support the Constitution without equal suffrage
in the Senate. "If no compromise should take place," the conse-
quence would be secession, "the result [of which] no man could
foresee." 55
Underscoring Gerry's point, Paterson insisted that equal suffrage
was necessary to enable the small states to defend themselves: "There
was no other ground of accommodation. His resolution was fixt. He
45 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 27, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 436, 437-38.
46 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 28, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 444, 444-45.
47 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 30, 1787), in I
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 481, 490.
48 Id. at 492.
49 SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 2, 1787), in I
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 510, 510.
50 Id. at 511.
51 See id. at 516.
52 Journal of the Constitutional Convention (July 5, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 11, at 524, 524.
53 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 5, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 526, 527.
54 Id. at 532.
55 Id.
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would meet the large States on that Ground and no other."56 When
the Pennsylvania delegates continued to resist the report, Martin
responded that "[h]e was for letting a separation take place if [the
large States] desired it. He had rather there should be two Confeder-
acies, than one founded on any other principle than an equality of
votes in the 2d branch at least."57 The small states' willingness to
block the Constitution had its intended effect. In the end, the Con-
vention voted five states to four to establish equal suffrage in the Sen-
ate.58 As Jack Rakove has observed, the resolution of "the prolonged
dispute over the Senate[] is usually regarded as the great turning
point of the Convention."59
The next day, the Convention reconsidered and rejected the con-
gressional negative, the other aspect of the Virginia Plan that had
divided large and small states. Perhaps encouraged by recent events,
delegates from smaller states now openly denounced giving Congress
even a limited power to negative state law. For example, Madison
reports that "Mr. Govr. Morris was more & more opposed to the nega-
tive. The proposal of it would disgust all the States."60 Despite
Madison's efforts to save the negative, 61 the Convention rejected the
proposal by a vote of seven states to three. 62 In place of the negative,
the Convention unanimously approved Luther Martin's proposal to
adopt the Supremacy Clause (originally proposed as part of the New
Jersey Plan).63 Finally, at the end of the Convention, the small states
56 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 7, 1787), in I
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 549, 551.
57 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2
FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 11, at 2, 4.
58 SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 16, 1787), in
2 FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 11, at 15, 15.
59 RAKOVE, supra note 26, at 58.
60 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention Uuly 17, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 25, 28.
61 See id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 28-29; seeJournal of the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 21, 22. The Clause, as proposed by Martin and
unanimously accepted by the delegates, provided
that the legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in pursuance
of the articles of Union and all Treaties made and ratified under the author-
ity of the United States shall be the supreme law of the respective States as
far as those acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens
and Inhabitants-and that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be
bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the indi-
vidual States to the contrary notwithstanding.
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further entrenched their gains by exempting the states' equal suffrage
in the Senate from future amendment by ordinary means. 64
As discussed below, the combined effect of these concessions-in
conjunction with carefully crafted federal lawmaking procedures-
was to give small states (acting through the Senate) disproportionate
and perpetual power under the Constitution to block or reshape all
future proposals to adopt "the supreme Law of the Land. '65 Both
sides understood this consequence to be the price of obtaining the
small states' assent to the Constitution. Thus, during the ratification
debates, the Federalists described the "equality of representation in
the Senate" as "evidently the result of compromise between the oppo-
site pretentions of the large and the small States. '66 They also frankly
acknowledged that "[a] government founded on principles more con-
sonant to the wishes of the larger States is not likely to be obtained
from the smaller States. 6 7
B. Compromise and Federal Lawmaking
Although the Convention rejected the New Jersey Plan, it ulti-
mately satisfied the small states' demands by incorporating two of that
Plan's most salient features-equal suffrage in the Senate and the
Supremacy Clause-into the Virginia Plan. The combined effect of
these decisions was to give the small states disproportionate influence
over a wide array of important decisions assigned to the new federal
government. The Senate, of course, was designed to be the means of
such influence. The Constitution assigns the Senate a wide variety of
important functions. For example, the Senate tries impeachments68
Id. The Clause was later modified slightly by the Committee of Detail. See James
Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 FAJRRND'S
RECORDS, supra note 11, at 177, 183 (referring to "[t]he Acts of the Legislature of the
United States made in pursuance of this Constitution"). The Committee's chairman,
John Rutledge, proposed two further alterations that were adopted without debate or
dissent. SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 384, 389 (proposing a revised version
adding "This Constitution" to the beginning of the Clause and replacing the phrase,
"[t] he Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitu-
tion," with the phrase, "the laws of the U.S. made in pursuance thereof").
64 SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 15, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 622, 631 (altering Article V to provide
"'that no State, without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Sen-
ate"' (quoting Morris' proposed amendment to Article V)).
65 See infra Part I.B.
66 THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison), supra note 24, at 377.
67 Id.
68 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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and must consent to the appointment of "Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States." 69 More importantly for our purposes,
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures call upon the Sen-
ate to propose constitutional amendments (with the House of Repre-
sentatives) 70 to enact laws (with the House and the President),71 and
to make treaties (with the President).72
The Supremacy Clause magnifies the significance of the Senate
to the federal-state balance by conferring the status of "the supreme
Law of the Land" only on sources of law adopted with the participa-
tion and assent of the Senate or the states themselves-that is, the
"Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the United States. 73 Luther
Martin-"perhaps the Convention's most committed confederation-
ist" 4-moved to adopt the Supremacy Clause only after the small
states had secured equal suffrage in the Senate and after it appeared
likely that the Senate would have an essential role in adopting both
laws and treaties. 75 By granting the states equal suffrage in the Senate
and simultaneously restricting supremacy to sources of law adopted by
69 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
70 See id. art. V.
71 See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
72 See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
73 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
74 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 27, at 730.
75 Martin moved to adopt the Supremacy Clause on July 17, 1787, just one day
after the Convention voted to give the states equal suffrage in the Senate. See supra
notes 58, 63 and accompanying text. The Virginia Plan originally proposed that a
"National Legislature," composed of two branches, enact laws subject to disapproval
by "a council of revision." See Madison, supra note 30, at 21. Although the Virginia
Plan was silent regarding treaties, Alexander Hamilton proposed that "the Execu-
tive ... have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power of making all
treaties." See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18,
1787), in 1 FARRAND'S REcoRs, supra note 11, at 282, 292; see also Arthur Bestor,
Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Histori-
cally Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 590 (1974) (explaining that Hamilton took
care "[t]o make sure that the role of the Senate would not be overlooked or down-
graded"). The Committee of Detail's draft vested the Senate with sole power to make
treaties. See Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), supra
note 63, at 183. In August, the delegates debated whether to add the House of Repre-
sentatives, the President, or both to the treatymaking process. See Bestor, supra, at
630-38. The Treaty Clause was later revised to include the President in addition to
the Senate and to specify the two-thirds requirement. SeeJames Madison, Notes on
the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
11, at 496, 498-99. Although the delegates debated various amendments, none would
have removed the Senate from the ratification process. SeeJames Madison, Notes on
the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 7, 1787), in 2 FARRAND's REcoRDs, supra note
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the Senate, the Constitution gives small states disproportionate power
to block-or use their leverage to alter-all federal measures capable
of displacing state law.
Both proponents and opponents of equal suffrage understood
the consequences of the decision in just these terms. That is why the
issue was so divisive and brought the Convention to the brink of col-
lapse. 76 Proponents sought equal suffrage precisely because it would
enable the small states to defend their interests by blocking-or
threatening to block-federal action. William Johnson asked: "Does it
not seem to follow, that if the States as such are to exist they must be
armed with some power of self-defence." 77 "[O]therwise," as Roger
Sherman put it, "a few large States will rule the rest."78 Bedford lik-
ened the security offered by equal suffrage in the Senate to the execu-
tive's "negative on the laws" and asked, "[I]s it not of more
importance that the States should be protected, than that the Execu-
tive branch of the Govt. shd. be protected[?] '79 Paterson likewise
argued that "the small States would never be able to defend them-
selves without an equality of votes in the 2d. branch."80 For these del-
egates, empowering small states to defeat or alter federal laws in the
Senate was the primary purpose of the proposal. 8'
Large state delegates opposed equal suffrage for precisely the
same reasons that small state delegates sought it. Madison repeatedly
opposed equal suffrage because it would allow the small states
(through the Senate) to thwart the will of the majority. He also fore-
saw how the small states could use their power in the Senate to put the
interests of their citizens above those of the majority. Responding to
the argument "that an equality of votes in the 2d. branch was not only
necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe to the large
ones," he stressed that
11, at 535, 538, 540-41, 543; James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention
(Sept. 8, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 547, 547-50.
76 See supra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
77 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention Uune 29, 1787), in I
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 461, 461.
78 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 11, 1787), in I
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 11, at 196, 196.
79 Madison, supra note 53, at 531.
80 Madison, supra note 56, at 551.
81 See id. at 550 ("If they vote by States in the 2d. branch, and each State has an
equal vote, there must always be a majority of States as well as a majority of the people
on the side of public measures . . . ."); see also Madison, supra note 57, at 5 ("Mr.
Sherman urged the equality of votes . . . for the State Govts. which could not be
preserved unless they were represented & had a negative in the Genl. Government.").
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the Majority of States might still injure the majority of people. 1.
they could obstruct the interests and wishes of the majority. 2. they
could extort measures, repugnant to the wishes & interest of the
majority. 3. They could impose measures adverse thereto; as the 2d
branch will probly exercise some great powers, in which the 1st will
not participate.8 2
Madison reiterated this point after the Grand Committee recom-
mended equal suffrage in the Senate: Madison objected that if the
Constitution granted "an equality of votes in the 2d. branch," then
"the minority could negative the will of the majority of the people. '8 3
The large states regarded this consequence as a serious flaw, but the
small states saw it as the proposal's primary virtue.
Thus, when the Convention ultimately voted to give states equal
suffrage in the Senate, delegates on all sides fully understood that
structuring the Senate in this way would institutionalize the small
states' disproportionate power to block all federal measures subject to
Senate approval. This feature of the Constitution did not represent
the secret or idiosyncratic intent of the drafters, but was an obvious
consequence of the compromises required to produce agreement at
the Convention. Several subsequent decisions during the remainder
of the Convention only served to reinforce the significance of equal
suffrage in the Senate.
As discussed, the Convention rejected congressional power to
negative state law in favor of the carefully worded Supremacy Clause,
which recognizes only the "Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" as
"the supreme Law of the Land."8 4 Whereas the negative would have
allowed Congress to adjudicate conflicts between state and federal
law, the Supremacy Clause-augmented by Article III's parallel "aris-
ing under" jurisdiction-assigned this task to independent federal
and state courts.8 5 At the same time, the Convention adopted precise
procedures to govern the adoption of each source of supreme federal
law, and all of these procedures require the participation of the Sen-
ate or the states.8 6 Finally, the Convention exempted equal suffrage
in the Senate from ordinary amendment under Article V.87 The com-
bined effect of these provisions was to give small states-through the
82 Madison, supra note 47, at 486.
83 Madison, supra note 57, at 9.
84 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; supra note 63 and accompanying text.
85 See Anthony J. BelliaJr., The Origins of Article III "Arising Under"Jurisdiction, 57
DuKE L.J. 263, 292-317 (2007); Clark, supra note 4, at 1346-55; Liebman & Ryan,
supra note 27, at 699-760.
86 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Senate-disproportionate and perpetual power to block or temper
any and all attempts by the federal government to override state law.
Taken as a whole, therefore, "the entire Constitution of 1787 was in a
sense founded on compromises." 88
During the ratification debates, several prominent Federalists
who resisted equal suffrage in the Senate at the Convention now
invoked this feature to reassure Americans fearful that the states
might be giving up too much power.89 As Madison argued in The Fed-
eralist No. 62, "[T]he equal vote allowed to each State is at once a
constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in
the individual States and an instrument for preserving that residuary
sovereignty."90 In short, the Constitution was written, proposed, and
ratified on the contingent understandings that the states would have
equal suffrage in the Senate, and that the Senate's approval would be
necessary to adopt all forms of "the supreme Law of the Land."
C. Compromise and Interpretive Fidelity
Sometimes conflict among participants in the lawmaking process
is resolved by adopting vague or contradictory provisions. This was
not the case in Philadelphia. The small states enjoyed disproportion-
ate power under the Articles of Confederation and at the Convention
because each state was entitled to one vote.9' They used this power at
the Convention to perpetuate their disproportionate power under the
new Constitution. All participants in the debate correctly anticipated
that the Senate would have an essential role in adopting all forms of
supreme federal law. A rule of equal suffrage in the Senate guaran-
88 Jackson, supra note 28, at 997; see also F.L. Siddons, Constitutional Aspects of the
Tilman-McLaurin Controversy, 12 YALE L.J. 21, 23 (1902) (stating that "it is no exagger-
ation to declare that but for the acceptance of the principle of the equal suffrage of
the States, by the convention, there would have been no constitution to submit for
ratification").
89 For example, during the North Carolina convention,James Iredell responded
to fears about the power of the Senate in part by stressing the nature of its composi-
tion: "The manner in which our Senate is to be chosen gives us an additional security.
Our senators will not be chosen by a king, nor tainted by his influence. They are to
be chosen by different legislatures in the Union. Each is to choose two." 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 40 Uonathan Elliot ed., Phila.,J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891). Similarly,
Alexander Hamilton, during the New York convention, observed "that the equal vote
in the Senate was given to secure the rights of the states," and that "[i] t is proper that
the influence of the states should prevail to a certain extent." 2 id. at 319.
90 THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison), supra note 24, at 378.
91 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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teed the small states disproportionate power in the lawmaking process
to block or modify federal law whenever they objected to its content.
Although the small states could not persuade the delegates to
embrace the New Jersey Plan, they did convince them to incorporate
three concrete proposals into the new Constitution-equal suffrage in
the Senate,92 a Supremacy Clause that limited supremacy to three spe-
cific sources of law,93 and federal lawmaking procedures that required
the participation of the Senate to adopt each of these sources.94 The
combined effect of these carefully crafted provisions was to give small
states-through the Senate-disproportionate power to block any
and all attempts by the federal government to override state law. This
was the price that the large states had to pay to secure the small states'
assent to the new Constitution.
Carlos Vdzquez concludes that one could just as easily regard fed-
eral lawmaking procedures as safeguards of nationalism as safeguards
of federalism.9 5 Compared to the Articles of Confederation, he points
out, the "procedures set up by the Constitution for creating supreme
federal law ... make it easier to displace state law."96 Although Profes-
sor Vdzquez is correct, the Articles may not be the proper point of
comparison. All delegates to the Constitutional Convention agreed
on the need to give the central government more power than it pos-
sessed under the Articles of Confederation. The contested question
was how much more. Delegates from larger states sought representa-
tion in the Senate based on population, and strongly preferred the
congressional negative to the Supremacy Clause.9 7 If the larger states
had prevailed, then smaller states would have had no real opportunity
to block or alter attempts to override state law under the new Consti-
tution. As discussed, the small states refused to support a constitution
with these features, thus forcing the large states to compromise by
incorporating several important and precise provisions into their
92 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (stating that the Senate "shall be composed of
two Senators from each State"); id. art. V (providing that "no State, without its Con-
sent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate").
93 See id. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land").
94 See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (prescribing procedures for adopting laws); id. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2 (prescribing procedures for adopting treaties); id. art. V (prescribing procedures
for adopting constitutional amendments).
95 See Vdzquez, supra note 11.
96 Id. at 1603.
97 See supra notes 30-39, 60-63, 82-83 and accompanying text.
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plan. 98 These provisions were designed to afford the small states dis-
proportionate and perpetual power to block the adoption of-and
alter the content of-all forms of "the supreme Law of the Land."
The centrality of these compromises to the success of the Conven-
tion and the specificity of the provisions they produced suggest that
courts should adhere closely to their precise commands both to
remain faithful to the Constitution and to respect the rights of partici-
pants in the process. Professor Vdzquez attempts to downplay the sig-
nificance of these compromises by urging us to "look at [the original]
structure at a high level of generality." 99 Accordingly, he repeatedly
characterizes the constitutional structure as striking a balance
"between federalism and nationalism" 100 and "between the status quo
and change." 101 Courts necessarily have some degree of latitude when
construing open-ended constitutional provisions, such as Congress'
power to regulate commerce "among the several States." 0 2 By con-
trast, the lines of compromise reflected by the states' equal suffrage in
the Senate and the Senate's power to veto all forms of "the supreme
Law of the Land" are spelled out so carefully in the Constitution and
were so crucial to its adoption that they leave no real room for courts
to disregard these features.103 This means that-however one chooses
to characterize the compromise struck by the Founders-courts
should not permit the federal government to override state law
outside the Supremacy Clause-that is, without the participation and
assent of the Senate. Were courts to ignore the specific provisions
that implement the founding compromise, they would not only
undermine the legitimacy of the Constitution itself, but substitute
their views for those of the various participants authorized to speak for
the people in adopting and amending the Constitution. 10 4
This does not mean, of course, that constitutionally prescribed
lawmaking procedures always function to safeguard federalism. As
Professor Vdizquez reminds us, such procedures make it just as hard to
98 See supra Part I.A.
99 Vdzquez, supra note 11, at 1636.
100 E.g., id. at 1601.
101 Id. at 1625.
102 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103 See Manning, supra note 3, at 1713-20.
104 There are also important functional reasons for upholding constitutional com-
promise. SeeJackson, supra note 28, at 998 ("Compromise is important; compromise
between competing principles is often essential to constitution making and mainte-
nance; security in enforcement of compromises may be important for future bargain-
ing; and compromises may have become embedded in a legal landscape and require
continued enforcement in order to promote stability and coherence.").
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repeal federal law as to adopt such law.105 Similarly, Bill Eskridge
points out that the vetogates associated with federal lawmaking may
actually lead to more rather than less federal regulation as a result of
the "logrolling" and "bundling" frequently employed to secure enact-
ment of a given proposal.10 6 These phenomena are even more likely
now that Senators are no longer chosen by state legislatures. 10 7
Although one can debate whether the procedural safeguards of feder-
alism still function to protect the governance prerogatives of the
states,' 08 that point does not diminish the continuing constitutional
distribution of power between the large and small states in the law-
making process. Whether one wishes to adopt, amend, or repeal legis-
lation-or, indeed, to thwart any of these actions-the fact remains
that federal lawmaking procedures continue to give the small states
disproportionate power to further any of these goals. 10 9
The Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. City of New York'10
illustrates the point. There, the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto
Act 1 1' because it permitted the President to "amend[] two Acts of
Congress by repealing a portion of each"" 2 outside the "'single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure"' established by Arti-
cle I, Section 7.113 It was irrelevant to the Court's decision that the
Act under consideration-by giving the President an item veto-actu-
ally made it harder rather than easier for Congress to change the status
quo. The key to understanding the decision was that the Act vested a
form of lawmaking power in the President alone, and thereby
deprived the small states of their disproportionate power to influence
the final contours of federal appropriations legislation. By permitting
the President to cancel individual items of spending unilaterally, the
Act effectively deprived the small states of their power to insist on
compromise as the price of enactment. 114
105 See Vdzquez, supra note 11, at 1604-05.
106 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1449-53 (2008).
107 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
108 See Vdzquez, supra note 11, at 1606-07.
109 See Clark, supra note 4, at 1324, 1340.
110 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
111 Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
112 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438.
113 Id. at 439-40 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
114 A one-house legislative veto could similarly circumvent the small states' influ-
ence in the lawmaking process. See Clark, supra note 4, at 1382 ("If Congress could
authorize the House of Representatives to exercise lawmaking power without the Sen-
ate's consent, then it could strip the small states of the benefits of the compromise




Some features of the constitutional structure are spelled out so
carefully in the Constitution and were so central to the creation of the
federal system that they cannot be read out of the document without
fundamentally altering its character. The Senate's ability to veto all
forms of "the supreme Law of the Land" is one such feature. The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention disagreed sharply over the
proper basis for representation in the Senate, and ultimately agreed
to the small states' demand for equal suffrage in order to secure their
assent to the Constitution. The small states also succeeded in replac-
ing the congressional negative with the Supremacy Clause as the
mechanism for securing the supremacy of federal law. The effect of
these decisions-in conjunction with the lawmaking procedures speci-
fied by the Constitution-was to give small states (through the Sen-
ate) perpetual and disproportionate power to block the adoption of
all forms of federal law capable of displacing state law. Respect for the
fundamental compromises built into the Constitution counsels courts
to recognize the precise lawmaking procedures spelled out in the doc-
ument as the exclusive means of adopting "the supreme Law of the
Land."
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